While many non-human animals show basic exploratory behaviors, it remains unclear 19 whether any animals possess human-like curiosity. We propose that human-like curiosity satis-20 fies three formal criteria: (1) willingness to pay (or to sacrifice reward) to obtain information, (2) 21 that the information provides no instrumental or strategic benefit (and the subject understands 22
this), and (3) the amount the subject is willing to pay scales with the amount of information 23 available. Although previous work, including our own, demonstrates that some animals will sac-24 rifice juice rewards for information, that information normally predicts upcoming rewards and 25 their ostensible curiosity may therefore be a byproduct of reinforcement processes. Here we get 26 around this potential confound by showing that macaques sacrifice juice to obtain information 27 about counterfactual outcomes (outcomes that could have occurred had the subject chosen differ-28 ently). Moreover, willingness-to-pay scales with the information (Shannon entropy) offered by 29 the counterfactual option. These results demonstrate human-like curiosity in non-human animals 30 according to our strict criteria, which circumvent several confounds associated with less stringent 31 criteria. 32
INTRODUCTION 34
Curiosity is a major driver of exploration and learning. The term curiosity generally re-35 fers to information-seeking behavior that is intrinsically motivated (Golman & Loewenstein, 36 2016; Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Loewenstein, 1994; 37 Oudeyer, Kaplan, & Hafner, 2007) . The intrinsic factor distinguishes curiosity from strategic 38 forms of information seeking, such as exploration in bandit tasks ( ). Thus, a stringent definition of curiosity refers to 40 information seeking that reduces a decision-maker's information gap without producing immedi-41 ate or even potential reward or strategic benefits (Golman & Loewenstein, 2015; 2016 Kang et al., 2009; Loewenstein, 1994) . For example, many people will pay money to 44 for answers to trivia questions or to solve crossword puzzles even when those answers are pa-45 tently useless (i.e. trivial, Kang et al., 2009; Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014) . 46
Thus we propose a conservative definition for human-like curiosity that requires (1) a 47 willingness to pay for information, (2) the information is strategically useless, and (3) the infor-48 mation-seeking tendency increases with the amount of information provided (at least up to a 49 point, see Discussion). Is it not clear whether non-human animals possess human-like curiosity 50 according to this conservative definition (Kidd & Hayden, 2015) . Many animals naturally ex-51 plore their surroundings (Berlyne, 1966) . For example, monkeys seek specific information while 52 solving mechanical puzzles without immediate extrinsic motivations (Davis, Settlage, & Harlow, 53 1950; H. F. Harlow, 1950 ; H. F. Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer, 1950) . Rats also show spontaneous 54 exploration of unfamiliar maze sections without explicit reward or task (Dember, 1956; Hughes, 55 1968; Kivy, Earl, & Walker, 1956; Tolman, 1948 ). However, these information-seeking behav-56 gic benefits that could lead to greater future rewards. Likewise, in some uncertain contexts, ani-68 mals prefer risky options; these options may be favored because they provide more information 69 (Heilbronner & Hayden, 2013 . 81
That is, information in these tasks reliably predicts upcoming rewards. In a modified temporal 82 difference learning model, informative cues increases the subjects' engagement. The engagement 83 maintains the representation of subjective value associated with the cue and the states associative 84 with the objective reward. Thus, a non-informative (non-predictive) cue would lead to disen-85 gagement and a decrease in representation. This model predicts the preference for informative 86 choice due not to the curiosity for information, but to the engaged and maintained representation 87 of predicted value. Another related possibility is that animals may "superstitiously" believe that 88 their choices with information could affect upcoming rewards (Vasconcelos, Monteiro, & Ka-89 celnik, 2015) . 90
Most of these problems stem from the direct association between information and imme-91 diate or potential rewards. Therefore, one way to avoid these confounds is to focus on curiosity 92 about counterfactual outcomes. The term counterfactual refers to outcomes associated with op-93 tions that were not chosen (the terms hypothetical and fictive are also sometimes used, Abe Rosati & Hare, 2013). Therefore, counterfactual outcomes can potentially help avoid some prob-98 lems associated with paradigms in which curiosity-driving information relates to potential re-99
wards. 100
We devised a counterfactual information task for rhesus macaques. On each trial, sub-101 jects chose between two gambles with independently generated stakes, probabilities, and coun-102 terfactual information status. That is, some options offered, if chosen, the promise of information 103 about the result of the unchosen gamble; other options did not offer that information. We found 104
that monkeys actively sought out information of counterfactual outcome, despite the lack of its 105 instrumental benefits for current or future reward, and their preference for informative options 106
scaled with the amount of information (i.e. Shannon entropy). 107 108 109
RESULTS 110 111
Monkeys Seek Counterfactual Information 112
Two rhesus macaques performed a novel gambling task designed to measure the subjec-113 tive value placed on information about counterfactual outcomes (Figure 1A and Methods). On 114 each trial of the counterfactual information task, monkeys chose between two gambles (offer 1 115 and offer 2) presented on the left and the right side of the screen. Presentation was asynchronous; 116 order of sides was randomized. Gambles differed in three dimensions: payoff (small: 125 uL of 117 water; medium: 165 uL; large: 250 uL, indicated by yellow, blue, or green color); probability (0 118 to 1 in 0.01 increments, indicated by bar section height); and informativeness (that is, whether 119 the choice would lead to counterfactual information, indicated by the presence of an inscribed 120 circle, Figure 1A) . Payoff, probability, and informativeness were independently randomized for 121 each offer on each trial. On 50% of the trials, only one option was informative (info choice trials), 122 on 25% of the trials, both options were informative (forced info trials), and on the remaining 123 25%, neither option was informative (no info trials). 124
We have previously used this general structure (without the informativeness manipula-125 tion) to probe macaques' preferences for uncertainty and, through various controls, have demon-126 strated that they treat these as described gambles (Hayden, Heilbronner, & Platt, 2010; Heil-127 bronner & Hayden, 2016). Critically, over the training period before data collection, subjects had 128 ample opportunity to learn that the distribution of both actual outcome and counterfactual out-129 comes perfectly matched their probabilities. Monkeys' behavior following training suggested 130 that they understood the task. Most importantly, they chose the gamble with larger expected val-131 ue 82.06% of the time (subject B: 81.68%; subject J: 82.69%). This proportion is larger than ex-132 pected by chance (both subjects: X 2 =1865; P<0.001; subject B: X 2 =1133; P<0.001; subject J: 133 X 2 = 729.83; P<0.001; chi-square test). 134
Monkeys preferred gambles that provided counterfactual information. To measure the ef-135 fect of counterfactual information on choice, we used a multiple logistic regression model to fit 136 the probability of choosing offer 1 as a function of four variables, the expected values and in-137 formativeness of the two offers. The probability of choosing offer 1 was positively predicted by 138 expected value of offer 1 (B=0.0283, SE=0.0007, t-stat=38.94; P<0.001; Figure 2 A-C) and 139 negatively predicted by that of offer 2 (B=-0.0270, SE=0.0007, t-stat=-37.50; P<0.001). By in-140 cluding informativeness in the same model, it competed with expected values to explain variance 141 in behavior. We found that informativeness predicted choice above and beyond the effect of ex-142 pected value. Specifically, the probability of choosing offer 1 was positively predicted by its in-143 formativeness (B=0.2633, SE=0.0616, t-stat=4.27; P<0.001; logistic regression) and negatively 144 predicted by the informativeness of offer 2 (B=-0.2042, SE=0.0615, t-stat=-3.32; P=0.001; lo-145 gistic regression). This result shows that monkeys were more likely to choose options with larger 146 expected value and that provide counterfactual information. 147 148
Preference for counterfactual information scales with information 149
Observing the outcome of a gamble reduces uncertainty about the observed outcome and we use the term informational value differently than informativeness, which is the binary varia-164 ble we used in the previous section. Informational value refers to entropy, which is a continuous 165 variable. Informativeness and informational value are orthogonal in our task because of the fully 166 independently randomized probabilities for both options. 167
A logistic regression analysis that included informational value instead of informative-168 ness revealed, first (not surprisingly), that monkeys preferred the higher value options. Specifi-169 cally, probability of choosing offer 1 is positively predicted by the expected value of offer 1 170 (B=0.0281, SE=0.0007, t-stat=38.90; P<0.001; Figure 2 D-F) and negatively predicted by that 171 of offer 2 (B=-0.0268; SE= 0.0007; t-stat=-37.29; P<0.001). Second, and critically, the probabil-172 ity of choosing offer 1 was positively predicted by its informational value (B=0.3536; 173 SE=0.0653; t-stat=5.42; P<0.001;) and negatively predicted the informational value of offer 2 174 (B=-0.2773; SE=0.0650; t-stat=-4.26; P<0.001). Thus, informational value explained a signifi-175 cant portion of variance in choice behavior, above and beyond that was explained by expected 176 values. These results demonstrate that monkeys preferred options that provided higher entropy, 177
and thus larger amount of information. Therefore, monkeys' information-seeking tendency 178
scaled with the amount of information provided. 179 180
Monkeys prefer information, not the visual stimuli 181
One possible alternative explanation for monkeys' preference is that they seek the options 182 that have or that lead to more visual stimuli, which in this task are the informative options (Roper, 183 1999 ). To rule out this possibility, we conducted the following two analyses. Second, if monkeys' preference for informative gambles truly reflected their tendency to 201 seek more information, then using informational value, instead of informativeness, in the multi-202 ple logistic regression would yield a better fit to the choice behavior. Akaike information criteri-203 on (AIC) is one of the common measurements for formal model comparison. We found the mod-204 el incorporating entropy resulted in a smaller AIC score (AIC= 6571.97) than the previously de- Comparing these two AIC values, the model incorporating entropy resulted in an AIC weight of 209 98.41%, which means that this model is 98.41% more likely to be the one that resembles the true 210 data-generating model, and thus better describing the choice behavior (this percent roughly trans-211 lates to P=0.016 in traditional significance test; Equation 7; see Methods). These results further 212 confirm that monkeys' preferences for the informative gamble was driven by its informational 213 value, i.e. entropy, rather than driven by potential confounds, such as total visual stimuli on the 214 screen. 215 216
Monkeys do not use counterfactual information to update choice strategy 217
Although counterfactual information in our task provided no strategic benefit due to trial-218 to-trial independency, we wondered whether monkeys nonetheless acted as if it did; if so they 219 might have adjusted their strategy after receiving counterfactual information (Hayden et al., 220 2009 ). We thus examined changes in preference resulting from counterfactual information. 221
Choice accuracy (likelihood of choosing the option with the greater expected value) did not 222 measurably change after receiving counterfactual outcome information. Specifically, it was 223 81.48% (n= 4227) when the counterfactual outcome was revealed and 82.68% (n= 3914) when it 224 was not (X 2 =1.99; P=0.158; chi-square test). 225
The valence of counterfactual information also did not measurably affect subsequent 226 choices. Counterfactual information could potentially lead to either a good news condition (cho-227 sen gamble win and unchosen gamble loss, or, chosen win > unchosen win), or a bad news con-228 dition (chosen gamble loss and unchosen gamble win, or, chosen loss > unchosen loss). We 229 found no difference in subsequent choice accuracy following a good news condition (82.57%) 230 versus a bad news condition (81.02%; X2=2.24; P=0.134; chi-square test). Moreover, a bad news 231 condition (possibly leading to a regret-like state) did not motivate choice of the unchosen side 232 (X 2 =0.05; P=0.818; chi-square test) or original position (X 2 =0.07; P=0.789; chi-square test) rela-233 tive to a good news condition, and thus ruling out win-stay-lose-shift strategy based on counter-234 factual information. We also found no difference in subsequent information-seeking tendency 235 following a good new condition versus a bad news condition (53.46% versus 52.45%; X 2 =0.26; 236 P=0.609; chi-square test). These results show that counterfactual information did not lead to 237 measurable choice strategy shifts and argue against the possibility that our effects reflect errone-238 ous belief by our subjects about the meaning of the signals they see. 239
240
Measuring the value of curiosity for counterfactual information 241
To quantify the subjective value placed on counterfactual information, we generated psy-242 chometric curves showing probability of choosing the informative gamble as a function of ex-243 pected value difference between informative and non-informative gambles (Figure 2H ). This 244 curve was shifted to the left, indicating that monkeys sacrificed water reward for information. On 245 average, they sacrificed 6.40 uL of water reward (subject B: 6.41 uL; subject J: 6.37 uL) relative 246 to a pure reward-maximizing strategy (t-stat=4.87; P<0.001; t-test), to gain 0.014 bits (subject B: 247 0.0147 bits; subject J: 0.0135 bits) more information. This water payment for information is 248 5.32% the size of the average reward obtained per trial. Thus, monkeys sacrificed a small but 249 significant amount of primary reward to satisfy their curiosity about the counterfactual outcomes. 250
DISCUSSION 251 252
We find that when choosing between risky options, macaques prefer gambles that prom-253
ise information about what would have occurred had they chosen differently. This information, 254 known as counterfactual information, has no direct or indirect benefits and provides no infor-255 mation about the statistics of the current task environment. Indeed, we see no measurable effect 256 of counterfactual outcomes on strategic adjustments. As such our task satisfies the three strict 257 criteria we propose for human-like curiosity in non-human animals: (1) a willingness to pay for 258 information that (2) gives no strategic benefit and (3) the willingness to pay scales with amount 259 of information available. 260
Many non-human animals will explore new environments or stimuli (Kidd & Hayden, 261 2015) . Although exploratory behaviors may reflect curiosity, it is hard to ascertain whether they 262 reflect a drive for information per se. For this reason, many scholars favor more controlled para-263 digms. Many of these use observing behavior -a preference to reduce uncertainty about stochas-264 tic upcoming rewards. Observing behavior has been shown in numerous species; however, pre- In this light, another potential limitation is the possibility that seemingly information-272 seeking behaviors could have been a byproduct of other processes. One such process is when in-273 formation gained is a byproduct as animals explore and manipulate the environment to acquire 274 reward (Emery & Clayton, 2004 ; Thorndike, 2017) . Another example is that information seeking 275 leads to learning of the structure of a task and thus to strategic benefits (Daw et . In all cases, information is acquired not for 279 the gain of information but for the gain of other perceived instrumental benefits. 280
In the current task, we provided subjects with the opportunity to actively choose to reveal 281 counterfactual outcomes, even at the cost of primary rewards. Due to the cross-trial independent 282 design, counterfactual information provides neither immediate or future rewards, nor actual or 283 perceived strategic benefits. The lack of strategic adjustment after receiving counterfactual in-284 formation in our subjects confirmed the effectiveness of this manipulation. Importantly, animals' 285 willingness to pay scaled with the amount of information. This result reflects the idea that curios-286 ity must necessarily be a drive for information. That is, to use Loewenstein's term, it resolves an 287 information gap between current knowledge and potential knowledge (Golman & Loewenstein, 288 2015; 2016; Gruber et al., 2014; Loewenstein, 1994) . Therefore, our results bridged the theoreti-289 cal and empirical findings with formal information theory to show human-like curiosity in non-290 human primates. 291
Our formal criteria for curiosity include a requirement that amount of curiosity scales 292 with amount of information available. This criterion is important because it explicitly links os-293 tensible curiosity behavior to an information gap per se. It also provides a ready control for rein-294 forcement processes, such as engagement to cues and tracking of conditioned reinforcers. Note 295 that, formally speaking, we only require a positive relationship between entropy and willingness 296 to pay along a subset of possible values. Our criteria allow future research the possibility for 297 more complex relationship along a full range. For example, it is likely that demand form infor-298 mation eventually saturates and even decreases as entropy rises (Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 299 2012; . 300
These results have direct implications for neuroscientific research. The goal of under-301 standing curiosity is important for its role in driving choice and learning in uncertain environ-302 ments (Kidd & Hayden, 2015) . We offer a well-controlled paradigm for isolating curiosity from 303 potential confounds separating it from seemingly similar factors. One neuroscientific problem 304 that could benefit from our result is how curiosity influences learning and reward processes. Par- Subjects had never previously been exposed to decision-making tasks in which counter-367 factual information was available. Previous training history for these subjects included two types The Counterfactual Information Task 373
Two subjects (B and J) performed a novel task designed to measure preference for coun-374 terfactual information (Figure 1A) . On each trial subjects chose between two randomly selected 375 gambles, presented asynchronously on the left and the right side of the screen. Gambles were 376
represented as rectangular visual stimuli and differed in three dimensions: payoff, probability, 377 and informativeness. Payoff came in three sizes, small (125 microliters), medium (165 micro-378 liters), and large (250 microliters), each corresponding to a yellow, blue, and green portion of the 379 rectangle. Probabilities were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 (step 380 size of 0.01). The height of a portion of the rectangle with a payoff color indicated probability of 381 winning the gamble and the height of the red portion indicated the probability of losing the gam-382 ble (that is, of receiving no reward for that trial). Informativeness of a gamble was indicated by a 383 cyan dot on the center of the rectangle for an informative option and the lack of a cyan dot for a 384 non-informative one. The informative option promised valid information about the payoff that 385 would have occurred had the alternative option been chosen. On 50% of the trials, only one op-386 tion was informative, on 25% of trials, both gambles were informative, and on the remaining 387 25% of trials, neither gamble was informative. Probability, payoff, and informativeness were in-388 dependently randomized on each trial. 389
Each trial started with the appearance of offer 1 (500 ms) followed by a blank 500 ms de-390 lay. Offer 1 position was randomized for each trial. Then offer 2 appeared on the other side of 391 the screen (500 ms) followed by another 500 ms delay. After a 200 ms fixation, both gambles 392 appeared on the screen and subjects chose the preferred option by shifting gaze to it and main-393 taining that gaze for 200 ms. Subsequently, if an informative option was chosen, gamble results 394 for both offers were resolved. If a non-informative option was chosen, gamble results for only 395 the chosen offer was resolved. Resolution of a gamble involved filling the gamble rectangle with 396 the payoff color, while delivering a water reward, if the gamble result was win, or filling the 397 gamble rectangle with red color, while delivering no reward, if otherwise. This outcome epoch 398 lasted for 800 ms and was followed by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval (ITI) and then the start of 399 next trial. 400 401
Statistical Methods 402
All choices were counted as correct when subjects selected an option with expected value 403 greater than or equal to the non-chosen alternative. Chi-square test was conducted using R. Sub-404 jects' choice behavior was fitted using a multiple logistic regression model and was conducted 405 using MATLAB (Mathworks). T-test was also carried out with MATLAB. 406
A logistic regression was fitted to choice to assess whether subjects preferred informative 407 option, above and beyond the effect of expected value: 408
(1) 409 EV stands for expected value, which is the product of reward magnitude and reward 410 probability. Info is 1 when choice of an option leads to resolution of both chosen and unchosen 411 gambles and is 0 when it leads to the resolution of only the chosen gamble. 412
To quantify the amount of information provided when a gamble outcome is resolved, we 413 calculated the "information value" (IV) of each option. The IV is the uncertainty about the possi-414 ble outcomes that will be eliminated by either observing the outcome or receiving information: 415 the Shannon entropy (H) of the offer: 416
!"!,!
(2) 417 P is the reward probability associated with a gamble option. 418
When the non-informative offer is chosen, the informational value (IV) of this choice is: 419
When the informative offer is chosen, the informational value (IV) of this choice is: 421 = !!!"!" + !"#!!"#$ . (4) 422 A separate logistic regression was fitted to choice to assess whether subjects preferred 423 choice with higher informational value, above and beyond the effect of expected value: 424
A third logistic regression was fitted to allow for EV, the additional visual stimuli (Visu-426 al) that came with informativeness options, and informational value to compete to explain vari-427 ance in choice: 428
For model comparison, AIC weights was calculated as following: 
